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I. INTRODUCTION
In tort law's march into employment discrimination law, retaliation bears
recent tracks. While the intersection of torts and the substantive law of statusbased discrimination has attracted the most attention-sparked by the Supreme
Court's grab for proximate cause in the closely watched "cat's paw"
decision-retaliation is the site of tort law's most recent intrusion into Title
VII. So far, as with other areas of employment discrimination law, the
importation of tort-based concepts into retaliation law has served only to chip
away at employer liability. This Article explores how tort principles have
quietly taken root in retaliation law, with an eye toward pushing the tort
analogy in a different direction to sharpen the focus on employer wrongdoing.
II. THE "TORT" OF RETALIATION: NASSAR AND TORT-BASED LIMITS ON
CAUSATION
Nearly a quarter century has passed since the Supreme Court reached for
tort principles in a pair of sexual harassment cases to determine employer
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. Many thanks to all of the participants at the Symposium, and most
especially to Martha Chamallas for her comments on an earlier draft.
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liability rules under Title VII, drawing on inspiration from torts to impose
vicarious liability, subject to an affirmative defense imposing a duty on the
plaintiff to mitigate harm.' More recently in Staub v. Proctor Hospital,2 the
Court borrowed proximate cause from tort law to craft employer liability rules
for adverse actions prompted by subordinate bias (also known as the cat's paw
scenario) in an employment discrimination case. 3 By comparison, tort
principles came late to retaliation law, at least overtly. The Supreme Court
explicitly identified tort law as a source of authority for Title VII retaliation
claims in its 2013 decision in University of Texas Southwest Medical Center v.

Nassar.4 Nassar presented the issue of whether a retaliation plaintiff could
proceed on a "motivating-factor" model of causation, similar to Title VII
plaintiffs challenging status-based discrimination, or whether they must prove
the higher "but-for" standard of causation.5
The plaintiff in the case was a doctor, described as a person of Middle
Eastern descent, who complained about allegedly discriminatory treatment by
his supervisor. 6 Among the evidence suggesting bias, Dr. Nassar pointed to
disparaging remarks about Middle Easterners by his supervisor.7 Dr. Nassar
attempted to restructure his employment at the hospital so that he would not
have to report to this supervisor; in explaining to hospital administrators the
reason for this request, he described his supervisor as biased.8 According to
Dr. Nassar, the administrators responded by defending the supervisor and
punishing him for complaining. 9
Dr. Nassar sued the hospital for national origin discrimination and
retaliation.' 0 The district court sent the claims to the jury, which found for the
plaintiff on both claims." The Fifth Circuit overturned the verdict on the
discrimination claim for insufficient proof, but upheld the verdict on the
retaliation claim under a mixed-motive framework.12 The hospital challenged
this ruling in the Supreme Court, arguing that Dr. Nassar should have been
required to prove but-for causation-that the termination would not have

1
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1998).
2 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
3I. at 1194 (interpreting the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act).
4 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
5
Id. at 2524.
6
Id. at 2523.
7Id; Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 2012).
8

Nassar, 674 F.3d at 451.

9
Nassar, 133
10

S. Ct. at 2524.
M.
11Id. (reciting case history and noting jury award of over $400,000 for back pay and
more than $3,000,000 in compensatory damages, which the district court reduced to
$300,000).
12 Nassar,674 F.3d at 453-55.
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occurred but for the hospital's retaliatory motive. 13 In a decision notable for its
reliance on tort law, the Court sided with the hospital and overturned the
retaliation verdict, adopting the stricter but-for approach to causation for Title
VII retaliation claims. 14
Unlike Staub, where the Court borrowed proximate cause from tort law to
parse causation, 15 in Nassar the Court turned to tort law to set limits on
causation-in-fact. 16 In both cases, the Court used tort principles to justify its
selection of a standard that courts can use to rein in employer liability. In
Nassar,the Court did so despite having taken a markedly different approach to
causation-in-fact in an earlier Title VII precedent. In 1989, the Court ruled in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins17 that Title VII's "because of' language in

section 703(a) permits plaintiffs to prevail by proving that discrimination was
a "motivating part" (in the words of the plurality) or a "substantial factor" (in
the terminology used by the concurring justices), unless the defendant proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
without considering the discriminatory reason. 18 This ruling effectively shifted
the burden of proof onto the defendant to disprove but-for causation once the
plaintiff proves a discriminatory motivating (or substantial) factor.
Two years later, as part of a broader reform of employment discrimination
law to correct a series of anti-plaintiff judicial rulings, Congress embraced this
causation standard while making it more plaintiff-friendly in its
consequences.19 Instead of giving the defendant a defense to liability in the
same decision, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) codified the
defense as a defense to remedies only. Under the 1991 Act, a defendant can
avoid reinstatement and damages by proving that the plaintiff would have
20
suffered the adverse action even absent the discriminatory motivation. After
the 1991 Act, Title VII liability is established by proof that the discriminatory
reason was a "motivating factor." 2 1

13

Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2534.
14Id. at 2533.
15
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011).
16 Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2524-25. After Staub, lower courts have applied a similar
proximate cause limit to retaliation cases presenting the cat's paw scenario, where a biased
underling causes the adverse action taken by the ultimate decisionmaker. See Smith v.
Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2012); McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 176-77,
179 (3d Cir. 2011).
17
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
18Id at 250 (plurality opinion); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
19
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012)).
20
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B) (2012)).
21
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249. The "motivating factor" language corresponds
to the plurality's language in Price Waterhouse, rather than Justice O'Connor's subtly
different, "substantial factor" standard. Id. at 265.
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The difficulty the Court confronted in Nassar is one that has repeatedly
dogged the 1991 Act; in its embrace of a more plaintiff-friendly standard,
Congress only amended section 703 of Title VII, raising questions about the
implications for other, related, statutory provisions. 22 Both section 703(a), the
ban on status-based discrimination, and section 704(a), the retaliation
provision, use the words "because of' to define the unlawful employment
practice. 23 The 1991 Act codified the motivating-factor standard for statusbased discrimination, but said nothing about retaliation specifically. The most
aggressive reading of the 1991 amendment would interpret Congress's
embrace of the motivating-factor model in the new section 703(m) as a gloss
on other uses of "because of' elsewhere in the statute.2 4 It was no surprise that
the Court did not adopt such a robust reading of the 1991 Act, 25 but it was
surprising how far the Court went in the opposite direction. 26 The Nassar
majority not only refused to apply the 1991 Act's motivating-factor framework
to section 704(a), it rejected the pre-existing framework that the 1991 Act
codified (albeit, in a modified, more plaintiff-friendly way), abandoning the
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework for section 704(a) claims
altogether. 27 The Court read Congress's strengthening of the mixed-motive
model from Price Waterhouse as a wholesale rejection of the mixed-motive
model for section 704(a), leaving only the most defendant-friendly but-for
standard to govern such claims. 28 The Court's main support for jettisoning the
mixed-motive model came not from Title VII precedent, but from tort law. 29
The Court began its interpretation of "because of' in section 704(a) by
analogizing the Title VII retaliation claim to a tort. The Court explained,
"[c]ausation in fact. . . is a standard requirement of any tort claim. This
includes federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination." 30 The Court
22

See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretationof CongressionalOverrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 511, 538-51
(2009) (discussing this problem in the 1991 Act).
23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 25157 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a)) (2012)).
24 Widiss, supra note 22, at 550-51.
25
See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL.,

CASES AND MATERIALS

ON EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION 486 (8th ed. 2013) (noting that most circuit courts applied the Price

Waterhouse standard, and not the 1991 Act provision amending it, in retaliation claims).
26
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (interpreting the 1991 Act's
disparate impact provision's failure to amend the ADEA as leaving in place the Title VII
Wards Cove decision to govern the parallel disparate impact provision in the ADEA (citing
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989))); see also Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-76 (2009) (interpreting the ADEA to require proof of butfor causation, but in rejecting the applicability of the Price Waterhouse mixed motive
framework to the ADEA, noting that Title VII is a "different statute").
27
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525-27, 2534 (2013).
28
Id. at 2534.
29
1d. at 2524-25.
30
1d (citations omitted).
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then turned to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which it read to require

plaintiffs to prove but for causation in order to establish causation-in-fact. 3 1
This reading of tort principles contrasts sharply with that of Justice O'Connor
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse.32 She too turned to tort law to
interpret causation-in-fact under Title VII, but found it to support flipping the
burden of proof onto the defendant to disprove but for causation once the
plaintiff proves that the defendant's wrongdoing was a "substantial factor"
causing harm. 33
Not being a torts scholar, I will leave it to others to debate which version
of causation-in-fact best corresponds to tort law. 34 Whichever standard tort
law actually supports, the underlying reasons for the Court's more restrictive
reading of torts surfaced later in the Nassar opinion. As it did in Vance v. Ball
State University,35 a Title VII case decided the same Term as Nassar, the
Court prioritized ease of administration-a lightly veiled euphemism for
enabling courts to more easily grant motions for judgment as a matter of lawand the weeding out of non-meritorious claims. 36 Sounding more like a
common law court than a court engaging in statutory interpretation, the
majority cited the "central importance to the fair and responsible allocation of
resources [to] the judicial and litigation systems," and sounded a cautionary
note about the uptick in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
charges alleging retaliation. 37
Notably, for the first time, the Court in Nassar suggested a zero-sum
relationship between retaliation and discrimination claims. The Court warned
that adopting the more plaintiff-friendly causation standard would promote
frivolous retaliation claims, at the cost of siphoning away resources from
efforts to combat discrimination. 38 This newfound tension between retaliation
and discrimination strikes a new tune for the Court, which, in recent years, has
heralded the symbiotic relationship between the two claims and emphasized

31

Id. at 2525.
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
33
Id. at 263-64.
34 Justice Ginsburg, however, makes a persuasive case in her dissent in Nassar that
tort law does not support the majority's ruling. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133
S. Ct. 2517, 2546-47 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
35
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
36
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531-32; Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444.
37
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2531; see also id. at 2547 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Indeed,
the Court appears driven by a zeal to reduce the number of retaliation claims filed against
employers.").
38
Id. at 2531-32 ("[L]essening the causation standard could also contribute to the
filing of frivolous claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer,
administrative agencies, and courts to combat workplace harassment.").
32
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the need for broad protection from retaliation in order to fulfill the promise of
anti-discrimination law. 39
This change in tune also reflects changes in the composition of the Court
and the resulting voting blocks. Justice Kennedy, the author of Nassar, had
joined Justice Thomas's dissent in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education,40 the case that launched a series of cases reading broadly-worded
bans on discrimination to implicitly and by necessity encompass protection
from retaliation. 4 1 Justice Kennedy also dissented in Price Waterhouse, so he
has consistently favored but-for causation as the standard for Title VII. 42 With
the substitution of Justice Alito for Justice O'Connor (who was in the majority
in both Jackson and Price Waterhouse), the stage was set for the justices'
alignment in Nassar.
At bottom, the animating principle underlying the selection of tort
principles in Nassar is the pull of employment at will and the protection of
employer autonomy in managing the workplace. 43 This concern comes
through even in the majority's description of the facts, which paints a different
picture than the story told by the dissent and the lower courts in the case. 44

39

See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (2009);
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court'sAntiretaliationPrinciple,61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
375, 376-78 (2010); Michael J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The

RetaliationDecisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 923-24 (2009).
40
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
41 See id at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442, 451-52 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S.
474, 481-82 (2008) (interpreting the federal employee provision of the ADEA); cf Kasten
v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1329 (2011) (interpreting
FLSA retaliation provision to implicitly protect against retaliation for oral complaints,
despite statutory language making it unlawful to retaliate against an employee who "filed"
a complaint).
42 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43

See generally MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 99 (2d

ed. 2010) (stating that every state except Montana follows the employment at will common
law rule); Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 56-57, 93-96 (2007) (summarizing the meaning and history of
"the American rule" of at-will employment as the common law baseline from which
statutes craft exceptions).
44 Compare Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523-24, 2532 (describing facts in a way that
suggests the hospital was initially amenable to the plaintiffs requested restructuring but
changed its position because of generally applicable rules requiring all affiliated staff
doctors to be members of the faculty; and raising the specter of a conniving employee who
brings a specious discrimination complaint in order to manufacture a retaliation claim),
with id. at 2535-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (detailing the supervisor's different and more
demanding treatment of the plaintiff, her comments reflecting bias, and the unfounded
basis for her criticism of the plaintiff).
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After reading the majority's statement of facts, one might forget that the jury
ruled for the plaintiff on both the national origin and retaliation claims. 45
The Nassar opinion reads more like a tort case than a statutory decision.
After staging tort law as "the background against which Congress legislated,"
the majority concluded that Congress intended to incorporate tort law's
"default rules" rather than break from them. 46 Whether this importation of tort
law is a positive development or a lamentable one, 47 the Court's explicit
description of the Title VII retaliation claim as a tort leaves little reason to
believe that tort law's influence on retaliation law will end here. Indeed, tort
analogies may have more staying power in retaliation cases than the rest of
employment discrimination law. Status-based discrimination claims "map onto
no obvious tort," 4 8 but retaliation has a somewhat closer-although
troubling-analogue in the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. 4 9 As the discussion below demonstrates, even before the Nassar
decision, retaliation case law in the lower courts had already been deeply
affected by principles sounding in torts.
III. PROTECTED ACTIVITY AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH TORT LAW
While the Supreme Court's explicit reliance on tort law to construe Title
VII's retaliation provision has so far been limited to causation, the bigger
influence of torts on retaliation cases in the lower courts, albeit surreptitiously,
has been to narrow the scope of protected activity. 50 As I read the retaliation
cases in the lower courts, tort concepts sounding in plaintiff fault, employer
duty, and proximate cause have migrated into Title VII doctrine. to limit
protected activity-the threshold issue in a retaliation claim.
Two Title VII doctrines in particular limit the scope of protected activity
in ways that map onto tort principles: the reasonable belief doctrine and the
newly-minted manager rule. Like the Supreme Court in Nassar, lower courts
have crafted these limits in response to concerns that the retaliation claim
45

Id. at 2536-37 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (reciting this history and noting that
the district court reduced the jury's compensatory damages award on the discrimination
claim from over $3 million to $300,000 pursuant to the statutory cap).
46
Id. at 2525.
471For arguments criticizing the importation of tort principles into employment
discrimination statutes, see Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1199, 1232-35 (2013) [hereinafter Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause];
Sandra F. Sperino, DiscriminationStatutes, the Common Law, andProximate Cause, 2013
U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 [hereinafter Sperino, DiscriminationStatutes]; Charles A. Sullivan,
Tortifying Employment Discrimination,92 B.U. L. REv. 1431, 1432-34 (2012).

48See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1432 n.1 (noting that employment discrimination
"maps onto no obvious tort" and may be more similar to "a refusal to deal"); see also
Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 47, at 36-38 (discussing the difficulty of
"map[ping] employment discrimination claims onto traditional tort[s]").
49 See Slater, supra note 43, at 96-97 (describing the tort).
50

See infra pp. 8-17.
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would otherwise go too far in restricting employer autonomy and intrude too
deeply into the default regime of at-will employment.5 1
Before exploring these doctrines, and by way of background, a cursory
review of Title VII retaliation law is in order. An essential feature of
retaliation law is the bifurcation of the claim depending on whether the
plaintiff complained internally, to someone within the workplace, or
externally, to a government enforcement agency (the EEOC or a state fair
employment agency). 52 Title VII's retaliation provision has two separate
clauses, the opposition clause, which governs internal complaints, and the
participation clause, which governs external enforcement through the specified
channels. 53 Both avenues are protected, but internal opposition garners less
protection and is governed by distinctive doctrines circumscribing protected
activity; conversely, participation in formal enforcement channels earns the
highest level of protection. 54 Given the widespread adoption of internal antidiscrimination policies and grievance procedures by employers over the past
few decades, employees rarely take their complaints to outside agencies, at
least not before trying internal complaint channels first.55 If an external charge
is filed after an internal complaint, any retaliation occurring before the charge
was filed falls under the opposition clause rather than the participation
clause. 56 Because of the prominence of internal complaint channels in
workplaces today, gaps in protection under the opposition clause are especially
harmful to employees. Both doctrines addressed below, the reasonable belief

51 See, e.g., Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001);
Williams v. Serra Chevrolet Auto., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 865, 877-78 (E.D. Mich. 2014);
Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS-10-1933, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140207, at *45 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2013).
52
See, e.g., EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the participation clause applies only to Title VII's express enforcement
"machinery," such as "proceedings and activities" connected with a formal EEOC charge,
while internal complaints fall under the opposition clause).
53
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 247
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)) (making it an "unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees.. . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice . . . .") (the opposition clause); id. (making it an unlawful employment practice to
discriminate against an employee because he or she "has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter") (the participation clause).
54

55

See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 25, at 457-58.

See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REv. 859, 884-86, 930-31 (2008) (discussing the growth of
internal complaint procedures and the pressure on employees to use them and not take their
discrimination complaints directly to external enforcement channels).
56
See, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012);
Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003); Booker v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989).
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doctrine and the manager rule, fall under the opposition clause and restrict
what counts as protected activity under that clause.

A. The ReasonableBeliefDoctrine: UnreasonablePlaintiffs in Tort and
Retaliation
One of the most constraining doctrines in Title VII retaliation law is the
reasonable belief doctrine. While it had some traction in the lower courts
earlier, this doctrine secured its foothold in the 2000 Supreme Court case of
Clark County School District v. Breeden.57 Without foreclosing the possibility

that an even tougher standard might apply, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs
retaliation claim under the opposition clause for lack of a reasonable belief that
the conduct she opposed actually violated Title VII.58 As the Court applied
this rule, the complaining employee must have an objectively reasonable
belief, both legally and factually, that the underlying conduct violated Title
VII in order to be protected from retaliation for an internal complaint. 59 The
doctrine tracks tort law in its use of plaintiff fault, measured by an objective
reasonableness standard, to limit recovery.
As numerous critics have noted, the Breeden case is the paradigmatic case
of bad facts making bad law. 60 The plaintiff, a woman, was offended by a
verbal exchange during a meeting with a male supervisor and a male coworker. 6 1 While the three were in a meeting reviewing applicant files, one of
the men commented on a note in an applicant's personnel file that he once said
to a woman, "I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand
Canyon." 62 He then turned to the other man in the meeting and said, "I don't
know what that means." 63 This man replied, "[w]ell, I'll tell you later," and
both men laughed. 64 The plaintiff, who heard the remark and the laughter, was
offended. 65 She complained internally, following the employer's anti57 Clark
58 Id. at

Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
271. The Court assumed, without deciding, that this was the governing

standard, as opposed to requiring the plaintiff to prove that the underlying conduct was
actually unlawful.
59
Id. at 270.
60
See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 55, at 915-29; Brianne J. Gorod,
Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title VII's Anti-RetaliationProvision, 56 AM.
U. L. REV. 1469, 1471-72 (2007); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker's Friend:Retaliation
Against Third Parties and the Right ofAssociation in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REv. 931,

955 (2007); Moberly, supra note 39, at 389 n.71; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not
to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for
Opposition Activities Under Title VII's Anti-RetaliationProvision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127,

1176 (2007).

61 Breeden, 532

62

Id. at 269.
63
Id
64
Id
65
Id

U.S. at 269-70.
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discrimination policy and complaint procedure. 66 The Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of her retaliation claim, ruling that the complaint
was not protected activity because the plaintiff lacked an objectively
reasonable belief that the comment and laughter met the severe or pervasive
standard for an actionable hostile environment.6 7
The significance of Breeden for retaliation claims arising out of an internal
complaint is twofold. First, the Court evaluated reasonableness based on the
case law governing actionable harassment under Title VII. 68 Because one
sexually offensive incident is not enough, as a matter of law, to create a hostile
environment, the Court ruled, it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to believe
otherwise. 69 The Court's failure to consider reasonableness from the
employee's perspective departs from its approach in assessing the degree of
adversity required for a retaliatory action, which asks whether it would likely
deter a reasonable employee in the circumstances of the plaintiff from
complaining. 70
Second, the Court determined the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
perception based entirely on the governing law, without considering the scope
of the employer's sexual harassment policy. In fact, the employer's policy
proscribed a wide range of conduct, broadly defining sexual harassment to
encompass '.'uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks and questions." 7 ' The
Court did not mention that the plaintiff had followed this policy in reporting
the incident, a fact that the Ninth Circuit had relied on in ruling that, while the
incident did not violate Title VII, the plaintiffs belief that it did was
reasonable. 7 2
Since Breeden, the reasonable belief doctrine has taken off in the lower
courts. Following the Supreme Court's lead, lower courts use judicial
understandings of actionable discrimination to set a ceiling on the
reasonableness of employee perceptions of discrimination. 73 Rather than using
66

Id at 269-70.

67

Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270-71.
68 Id
69 Id
70 Burlington

N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69-71 (2006)
(considering that the plaintiff was the only woman in her department, and using the
example of a single mother with child care responsibilities to show how an employee's
circumstances might affect a court's determination of whether the retaliatory acts would
likely dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining).

71 Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 726, 728
(9th Cir. 2000) (BNA) (citing the employer's policy).
72Id

7 See, e.g., Session v. Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Bd., 462 F. App'x 323, 326 (4th Cir.
2012) (finding that two comments perceived by plaintiff to be subjectively insulting were
"inadequate as a matter of law" to sustain plaintiffs retaliation claim); Wilson v. Farley,
203 F. App'x 239, 247-48 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that plaintiffs complaint about a
single remark by a co-worker was not objectively reasonable); Butts v. Ameripath, Inc.,
794 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1292-94 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (suggesting, in dicta, that a one-time
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the perspective of a reasonable employee or a reasonable layperson, courts use
their own perspective, informed by case law, to gauge the reasonableness of
the legal and factual support for the employee's belief in discrimination. 74 As
one court put it: "A plaintiff may not stand on his ignorance of the substantive
law to argue that his belief was reasonable." 75
Lower courts have copied Breeden's disregard of employer antidiscrimination policies in judging the employee's reasonableness. In a recent
article, I examined numerous cases in which courts have persisted in
measuring reasonableness by narrow legal interpretations, even when the
plaintiffs perspective matches the scope of the employer's anti-discrimination
policy. 76 This creates a troubling dilemma for employees because employer
ariti-discrimination policies often encompass a broader range of conduct than
what is prohibited by Title VII." Employer anti-harassment policies, for
example, extend far beyond actionable harassment, often using the term
harassment interchangeably with incivility and disrespect. 78 Far from
cautioning employees about reporting harassing behavior before it becomes
severe or pervasive, they encourage and even direct employees to immediately
report conduct falling within the policy. One model harassment policy posted
on a major website for legal resources instructs, "If an employee feels that he
or she has been harassed on the basis of his or her sex, race, national origin,
ethic [sic] background, or any other legally protected characteristic they
should immediately report the matter to his or her supervisor." 79 Such broad
policies shape employees' understanding of, and response to, workplace
harassment.80

exposure to numerous racially insensitive e-mails "most likely" did not support an
objectively reasonable belief in a hostile work environment); Mitchell v. Barnard Constr.
Co., No. 08-81087-CIV, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 661, 664 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009)
(BNA) (rejecting plaintiffs retaliation claim because co-worker's single racist remark did
not support an objectively reasonable belief in a hostile work environment).
74
See cases cited supra note 73.
75 Mitchell v. Barnard Constr. Co., No. 08-81087-CIV, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 661,
664 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009) (BNA).
76
See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 140-43
(2014) [hereinafter Brake, EEO World].
77
1d. at 143-44, 147-49.
78
See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2093-2103
(2003).
79
Sample Anti-Discrimination and HarassmentPolicies, FINDLAW, http:/smallbusiness.
findlaw.com/employment-law-and-human-resources/sample-anti-discrimination-andharassment-policies.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JK38-2LRC;
see also Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., No. 11-cv-02850-JPM-tmp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125999, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 6, 2013) (reciting employer anti-discrimination and
harassment policy listing among potential forms of harassment, "language or comments that
are offensive including hostile, mocking or lewd comments or jokes or intimidation that alters
work efficiency") (internal quotation marks omitted).
an individual's
80
See FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 200-204 (2009).
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Employer policies, and their effects on employee perceptions, are not
limited to harassment. They commonly address other forms of discrimination
too, and define it more broadly than legal authorities. Blending commitments
to diversity with promises of non-discrimination, such policies blur the line
between non-discrimination and affirmative action.8 1 In the same breath that
they prohibit discrimination, they proclaim support for diversity and increasing
the representation of persons from historically underrepresented groups. 82
They also frequently cover classes of persons beyond the categories protected
by Title VII, for example, including sexual orientation and gender identity in
promises of fairness and inclusion.8 3 Such policies play a bigger role than the
external law in shaping employee perceptions of discrimination. 84 No wonder,
then, that employee perceptions of discrimination often extend beyond actual
unlawful discrimination.
The clash between employee understandings of discrimination and the
law's narrower, more circumscribed definition has created a doctrinal crisis in
courts' application of the reasonable belief doctrine. In a case starkly
illustrating this conflict in the realm of racial harassment, Jordan v. Alternative
Resources Corp.,85 the plaintiff, an African-American man, had complained of
a racially offensive statement made by a white co-worker. 86 In the company
break room, while watching televised coverage of a police capture of two
African-American suspects in several highly publicized sniper shootings in the
Washington, D.C. area, a white male employee blurted out, "They should put
those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the apes
f-k them." 87 The plaintiff was offended, and in talking with other coworkers, learned that this same colleague had a history of making racially
offensive comments at work.88 The plaintiff complained about the co-worker's
offensive remark, was terminated, and sued for retaliation. 89
The district court granted the employer's motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim, ruling that the plaintiff did not engage in protected
activity because one racist comment does not create an actionable hostile
environment, even combined with knowledge that the same co-worker had
81
Id. at
82
1d. at
83

14, 42, 72.
142-44, 148-49.
Id. at 144, 201; see also Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, Economic Motives for

Adopting LGBT-Related Workplace Policies, WILLIAMS INST., Oct. 2011, at 1, available at

http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Mallory-Sears-Corp-StatementsOct201 1.pdf (reporting that 87% of Fortune 500 companies have policies prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and 41% have policies including gender
identity).
84
See DOBBIN, supra note 80, at 7-10.
85 Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
861d. at 339-40.
87

d. at 336.
at 337.
1d. at 336.

88
1d.
89
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made similar comments previously. 9 0 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in an
opinion that did not mention the fact that the plaintiff had followed the
company's anti-harassment policy directing employees to report conduct they
perceived as discriminatory. 9 1 Even the dissenting judge mentioned this fact
more in passing than as a full-blown argument for enlarging the perspective
used to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs belief in
discrimination. 92 The district court had mentioned the policy only in the course
of ruling on the plaintiffs state law claim for breach of contract, which the
plaintiff also lost, on the grounds that the policy disclaimed creating any
enforceable rights that would limit the employer's discretion to fire an
employee at will. 93
A decade and a half after Breeden, there is a sizeable and growing number
of lower court decisions applying the reasonable belief doctrine to deny
protected activity despite employer policies encouraging the plaintiffs
complaint. Courts consistently find an absence of protected activity when the
plaintiff reports conduct that could potentially-if it continued-add up to a
hostile environment. 94 The fact patterns giving rise to the employee
complaints in these cases include hostile epithets by co-workers and
demeaning sexual or racial comments by managers. In one particularly vivid,
if otherwise unexceptional account, a district court in Alabama boldly
proclaimed, the manager's "act of slapping [the plaintiff] on the buttocks in an
effort to make her comply with his demand [to pick up spilled equipment from
the floor] is certainly not condoned by this court, however, it was not an act
which reasonably could be perceived as sexual harassment under Eleventh
Circuit law." 95 This statement was followed by a string citation of cases with
parentheticals describing sexually explicit facts that courts had ruled fell short
of an actionable hostile environment, and no mention of whether the employer
had a policy prohibiting such conduct. 96
A variation on this line of cases deems complaints of harassment
unreasonable because the alleged harassment did not involve a protected class
under Title VII. For example, this problem arises when the court views the
employee's internal complaint as involving harassment based on sexual
90 Jordan

v. Alt. Res. Corp., No. DKC 2004-1091, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5279, at

*11-15 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2005).
91
Jordan,458 F.3d at 339-40.
92
1d. at 350 (King, J., dissenting).
93
Jordan,-2005U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5279, at *17-20. The plaintiff also brought and lost
a state law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for failure to
sufficiently identify a clear public policy that the employer's conduct violated. Id. at *1516.
94
See Brake, EEO World, supra note 76, at 140-43 (collecting cases); Brake &
Grossman, supra note 55, at 923-28 (same); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L.
REv. 18, 87-88 & n.242 (2005) (same).
95Hill v. Guyoungtech USA, Inc., No. 07-0750-KD-M, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69388, at *30 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 26, 2008).
961d. at *21-27.
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orientation, but not sex, and therefore falling outside the reach of Title VII.
Even if the employer's policy covers sexual orientation discrimination and
harassment, a plaintiff can lose the retaliation claim for unreasonably believing
that anti-gay harassment violates Title VII. 97 Many employer policies make no
such artificial distinctions, however. 98
The reasonable belief cases are not limited to employee complaints about
harassment. Other kinds of complaints about discrimination are also ensnared
in this doctrine. One common case involves complaints about the employer's
failure to follow its affirmative action policy, such as by not bringing in a
diverse group of candidates for a position, or not being sufficiently attentive to
an institutional lack of diversity. In these cases, courts insist that the plaintiff
lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the employer's failure to engage in
affirmative action or to promote diversity violated Title VII, without regard to
the existence of employer policies blurring promises of diversity, affirmative
action, and non-discrimination. 9 9 Some of these cases arise in university
settings, which have some of the broadest policies on diversity and affirmative
action.100

In all of these cases, the fact that the plaintiff followed an internal policy
does not affect courts' judgments about the reasonableness of the plaintiffs
complaint. Because courts do not find employer anti-discrimination policies
relevant to the reasonable belief doctrine, they rarely discuss them in detail,
making it virtually impossible to tell how the policies corresponded to
plaintiffs' perceptions of discrimination.
While the courts do not specifically say that they are borrowing from tort
law in these cases, the question this doctrine asks-whether the employee was
reasonable in perceiving unlawful discrimination-has an obvious analogue in
tort law's reasonable person standard. 0 ' Tort law uses reasonableness not just
97

See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062-63, 1066

(7th Cir. 2003); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 708
(7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 262-63 (1st
Cir. 1999); Ogle v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 2:09-CV-317-PPS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

116212, at *15 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 23, 2011).
98

See Sears & Mallory, supra note 83, at 1.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., No. 90-5603, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3856, at *2-5 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991); Miller-Calabrese v. Cont'l Grain Co., No.
96 C 6626, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9944, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1997); Holden v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 793 F.2d 745, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986). See also DOBBIN, supra note
80, at 14 (discussing how employers came to merge nondiscrimination and affirmative
action in their EEO policies).
100 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 566-68 (6th Cir. 2000);
Manoharan v. Colum. Univ. Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 592-94 (2d
Cir. 1988); Montgomery v. DePaul Univ., No. 10 C 78, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128206, at
*25-30 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2012).
99

101 Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on ThirdParty Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1351, 1352 (2010) ("The

'objective' reasonable person standard ... is a staple of tort law .... .").
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to measure the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct (once a duty is
established), but also the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct.102 The
reasonable belief doctrine operates as a de facto rule of contributory
negligence.
If we adjust the tort lens a little, the reasonable belief doctrine might also
be compared to a no-duty rule or, to a lesser extent, proximate cause. Much
like a no-duty rule, the reasonable belief doctrine cuts off the employer's duty
not to retaliate in the class of cases where plaintiffs complain about
discrimination that a supposedly reasonable person would know is not
actionable. No-duty rules have been a focal point of contention in tort law
increasingly in recent years, as a battleground for policy clashes over the
proper scope of liability.103
Alternatively, the reasonable belief doctrine might be compared to
proximate cause. Like proximate cause, it limits the type of harm the
defendant is expected to foresee and take care to avoid causing.104 The
analogy to proximate cause is more of a stretch, however, because proximate
cause typically cuts off liability for the defendant's negligence when it results
in a harm that differs from the harm normally to be expected; in a retaliation
case, the adverse action (the firing, for example) is precisely the kind of harm
anticipated. 0 5 Still, proximate cause is notoriously malleable, 106 and changing
the level of generality used to describe the harm might sharpen the doctrine's
resemblance to proximate cause. If the harm is described more particularly, as
firing an employee for acting on a mistaken belief about discrimination, the
reasonable belief doctrine begins to look more like proximate cause, because it
too places the harm outside the class of harms for which the defendant is
liable.
The "play" between the doctrines here, no-duty rules and proximate cause,
is a manifestation of the slippery line separating them. In the final analysis, the
potential for analogizing the reasonable belief doctrine to more than one tort
doctrine speaks to the malleability of tort doctrine, rather than undermining the
force of the comparison between the reasonable belief doctrine and
contributory negligence. In my view, the reasonable belief doctrine's focus on
employee reasonableness makes contributory negligence the most on-point
analogue.
And yet, while retaliation's reasonable belief doctrine generally tracks the
role that plaintiff fault plays in tort law, in two important respects, it is more
102 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 277 (2000) (discussing the objective
reasonable person standard in tort law and stating, "[t]he standard applies equally when the
issue is the plaintiffs contributory negligence").
103 See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 671,

703-13 (2008).

104 DOBBS, supra note 102, § 180, at 443-45.
1 am indebted to Martha Chamallas for this insight.
105
I06 See Jessie Allen, The Persistenceof Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives

on Skepticism, 90 DENV. U. L. REv. 77, 82 (2012).
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draconian than its counterpart in torts. First, Title VII's reasonable belief
doctrine places a total bar on recovery. It functions similar to the harshest of
the variations on plaintiff unreasonableness in tort law, the contributory
negligence rule. 10 7 While contributory negligence was once the majority rule,
over time, reform has paved the way for a more calibrated approach to plaintiff
fault.' 0 8 The majority rule now assesses comparative negligence and then
reduces the plaintiffs recovery to reflect the percentage of the parties'
respective fault.109 Jurisdictions vary in how they apply comparative
negligence-some forbid any recovery if the plaintiff is more than fifty
percent at fault, while others assess damages even if the plaintiffs share of
fault is higher.1 10 The reasonable belief doctrine invites no such comparison of
the employee's fault in misperceiving discrimination and the employer's fault
in promoting such an understanding through the promulgation of broad nondiscrimination policies.111 Title VII doctrine thus has a more anti-plaintiff bent
than tort law's approach to plaintiff fault.
Second, retaliation parts ways with torts on the issue of perspective-from
whose perspective to judge the plaintiff s reasonableness. This departure is not
quite so stark, however. Both tort law and Title VII retaliation law ignore one
significant dimension of the plaintiffs perspective: neither considers the way
the plaintiff s perspective is shaped by social group identity.11 2 Tort law does
not use a "reasonable woman" perspective, for example, in asking if a female
plaintiff acted negligently.11 3 Likewise, Title VII's reasonable belief doctrine
does not consider how a plaintiffs race or gender shaped the perception of
discrimination, even though research shows that subjective perceptions of
discrimination vary greatly by race and gender."14
Despite this similarity, however, the reasonable belief doctrine goes
farther than tort law in disregarding the role of the plaintiffs perspective in
assessing reasonableness. Tort law's approach to plaintiff fault allows external
circumstances to bear on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct.11 5 The
reasonable belief cases, however, deny even this degree of subjectivity in the
assessment of plaintiff reasonableness. Courts do not consider the employee's
access to legal knowledge or the circumstances in the workplace under which
the employee formed the belief, such as the effect of an employer policy
107 See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 199, at 494.
08

1 Id. § 201, at 503-04.
109 Id

"10Id. § 201, at 505-06.
111 See supra pp. 1394-96.
1 2

1 See Chamallas,supra note 101, at 1358-61, 1368.

113 See id. at 1360-61.
'l4See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1276-80 (2012); Russell K.
Robinson, PerceptualSegregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105-06 (2008).
115Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1356-59 (contrasting external circumstances with

internal circumstances-such as age, frailty, etc.-which are not taken into consideration).

2014]

TORTIFYING RETALIATION

1391

addressing discrimination. Instead, judges measure reasonableness from their
own legally informed perspective on whether the conduct violates Title VII.
In addition to the doctrine of contributory negligence, plaintiff fault comes
up in a more particularized way in the closest tort analogue to retaliation, the
tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. As discussed in more
detail below, this is a notoriously stringent and difficult-to-win tort, and a
terrible blueprint for the statutory retaliation claim. Even here, however, the
role of plaintiff fault in this tort may not be quite as draconian as it is in the
Title VII reasonable belief cases. In a wrongful discharge tort, the employee's
mistaken understanding, when it forms the basis for opposing perceived
illegality by the employer, may pose a bar to the plaintiffs recovery.116
However, some courts will permit recovery if the employee acted on a good
faith belief.11 7 Even for those courts that require proof of actual illegality as
the predicate for the employee's protest, proof that the employer took actions
contributing to the employee's mistaken belief might be relevant to whether
the tort claim may proceed." 8 In the Title VII reasonable belief cases, in
contrast, employer policies encouraging a broader view of discrimination do
not affect how courts judge reasonableness, which is governed solely by the
external law.
So while the Title VII reasonable belief cases surreptitiously borrow from
tort law's reasonableness standard for measuring plaintiff fault, courts have
applied reasonableness in a way that is more hostile to plaintiffs in retaliation
cases. Tort concepts serve a similar function of narrowing the field of
employer liability in another Title VII retaliation doctrine, discussed below.
116 CRAIN ET AL., supra note 43, at 198 (discussing the role of the plaintiff s mistaken

belief in a wrongful discharge tort claim).
11
7See, e.g., Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 786-87 (Okla. 1995) (noting
precedents protecting "good faith reporting of infractions by the employer"); Palmer v.
Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 687-90 (Kan. 1988) (protecting employee's good faith reporting of
employer's unlawful misconduct); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571
(Minn. 1987) (same); Johnston v. Del Mar Distrib. Co., 776 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. App.
1989) (recognizing wrongful discharge tort claim where employee had a good faith belief
that her employer required her to do an act that would violate the criminal law); McQuary
v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 684 P.2d 21, 23-24 (Or. Ct. App.1984) (holding that
"employee is protected from discharge for good faith reporting of what the employee
believes to be patient mistreatment to an appropriate authority"); see also Stewart J.
Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Searchfor Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REv.

1943, 1970-71 (1996) (stating that tort law on wrongful discharge is "not always more
sympathetic to a whistleblower who is correct than to one who merely acts in good faith,"
and discussing cases protecting an employee who acts on a mistaken, but good faith,
belief).
118 See Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Wash. 1989) (stating that, in deciding a
tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on whistleblowing,
"courts generally examine the degree of alleged employer wrongdoing, together with the
reasonableness of the manner in which the employee reported, or attempted to remedy, the
alleged misconduct").

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

1392

[Vol. 75:6

B. The Manager Rule, Employer Duty, and Proximate Cause
A separate limit on protected activity under Title VII also has parallels
with tort principles. In a development that has accelerated in recent years,
lower courts have refused to find protected activity if the plaintiff performed
her assigned responsibilities to report, investigate, or otherwise address
discrimination in the workplace.11 9 The result is to effectively cut off the
employer's duty not to retaliate against employees whose job responsibilities
include oversight and enforcement of internal anti-discrimination policies.
Some courts call this the manager rule, while others describe the doctrine as
requiring employees with anti-discrimination compliance responsibilities to
step outside their roles. 120 This doctrine has roots in other areas of
employment law, both statutory and constitutional, and has increasingly
worked its way into Title VII.121
A recent case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Brush v. Sears
Holdings Corp., illustrates the doctrine.1 22 Janet Brush's duties included
investigating allegations of sexual harassment in the workplace.1 23 In the
course of one such investigation, Brush discovered that a female employee's
allegations of sexual harassment were more serious than first appeared,
involving several instances of rape by a supervisor.124 Brush took the position
that the alleged rapes should be reported to the police, but her superiors
disagreed.1 25 Brush was fired, she claimed because of her insistence that Sears
report the rapes to the police.126 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that even if true,
Brush did not engage in protected activity under Title VII.127 In sweeping
reasoning, the court articulated its agreement with the manager rule, describing
it as follows: "[T]he manager rule holds that a management employee that, in
the course of her normal job performance, disagrees with or opposes the
actions of an employer does not engage in protected activity."' 28 In order for
her normal job performance to become "protected activity," the court
continued,

she

"must

cross

the

line

from . .. performing

her

ll 9 See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, 50 TULSA L. REv.

(forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
120 Id

121 See McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1481 (10th Cir. 1996) (personnel
director did not engage in protected activity under the FLSA when she acted within her
official role to correct wage and hour disparities); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 424 (2006) (public employee did not engage in protected speech under the First
Amendment when she publicly complained about employer's misconduct because she
acted22within her official duties).
1 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App'x 781 (11th Cir. 2012).

123Id at 783.
124Id at 784.
125 Id

12 6 Id

127Id at 783.
12 8 Brush, 466 Fed. App'x at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Absent a personal complaint,

and "where . . . a third party is neither directly interested in the underlying

discrimination nor acting beyond the scope of her employment in opposing an
employer's action, no Title VII claim will lie."' 30 The court's reasoning uses
the plaintiffs scope of employment to cut short the defendant's duty not to
retaliate.131
Brush is representative of a trend in the lower courts to deny protected
activity where the plaintiff acted within the scope of her job's duties to address
internal discrimination complaints. While the particular result in Brush might
be defended as the court's way of handling a reasonable difference of opinion
between Brush and Sears over how, within the obligations of Title VII, to best
respond to rape allegations, the court's reasoning was not so limited.1 32 Other
courts have applied the manager rule to fact patterns where the dispute goes
beyond a reasonable difference in opinion over the best way to deal with a
complaint about discrimination. In one such case, Vidal v. Ramallo Bros.
Printing,Inc., 133 the plaintiff was a human resources director who received
several complaints from employees alleging that they had been sexually
harassed by the company president and vice-president, who were brothers. 134
When the plaintiff informed the brothers of his plans to investigate the
allegations, they ordered him not to do so, assuring him that they would handle
it themselves.135 The plaintiff disagreed with this course of conduct and was
fired.136 The court dismissed the retaliation claim for lack of protected
activity.137 As human resources director, the court explained, the plaintiffs
actions fell within his job responsibilities and were taken for the benefit of the
company.138 Like the court in Brush, this court distinguished between a human
resources employee who filed a complaint on his own behalf, which would be
protected, and this plaintiffs actions to address the complaints of others,
which were not protected.139
The logic of the manager rule is not limited to officially designated equal
employment opportunity (EEO) compliance personnel. Taken to its logical
extreme, the rule could extend to any employee whose supervisory
responsibilities include bringing forward and addressing the complaints of
subordinates. For example, in Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing

129 1d

(quoting McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996)).
1301d. at 788 n.8.
131Id. at787-88.
132Id at 784-87.
133
Vidal v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.P.R. 2005).
I34 Id at 61.
135 Id
136 Id
Id. at 62
Id
139 Vidal, 380 F.2d at 62.
137
138
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Alabama, LLC,140 the court applied this doctrine to bar a retaliation claim by a
manager who reported the discrimination complaints of persons he supervised
and then was fired.141 The court denied the existence of protected activity,
explaining that it was part of his job to alert the company to potentially
unlawful conduct; because he did not step outside of his assigned role, he did
not engage in opposition adversarial to the company.14 2
The manager rule creates a dilemma for the employees it covers,
especially when viewed in light of the broader framework of Title VII
retaliation law. A separate retaliation doctrine denies protected activity under
the opposition clause when the plaintiff opposes discrimination in an
unreasonable manner, such as by being disruptive or insubordinate. Under this
doctrine, an employee who, in the course of opposing discrimination, steps too
far outside her assigned role risks being fired for insubordination and
disloyalty. In a line of cases that began before the manager rule emerged,
courts rejected retaliation claims brought by employees with EEO
responsibilities for going beyond their assigned roles in the course of
performing their job duties.143 For example, in a case decided by the D.C.
Circuit in 1980, the court denied a retaliation claim brought by federal
employees serving as EEO counselors who were fired for being "too militant"
by participating in a protest demonstration against unequal employment
opportunities in the department.1 44 The court faulted the plaintiffs for going
beyond the EEO counseling functions of the job.145 Courts continue to enforce
this line, requiring the form of the opposition to be reasonable. 146 There is
scant space between stepping outside an employee's assigned role and steering
clear of insubordination and disloyalty so as to make the form of the
opposition unreasonable.
In applying the manager rule, courts use the employer's assignment of
anti-discrimination compliance responsibilities to deny protection from
retaliation to the employees performing those responsibilities, even when the
employee acts in a manner that would otherwise register as opposition to
discrimination. What purpose does this doctrine serve? One possibility is that
it functions as a quick-look judgment about causation-in-fact, based on an
assumption that an employer would not delegate anti-discrimination
responsibilities and then fire an employee for performing them. If this is the
assumption beneath the doctrine, however, it is misplaced. It ignores the
140

Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, No. 2:07cvl44-ID, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33826 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2008).
141Id. at *38-39.
142Id. at *35-39.
143 See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1986); Hochstadt
v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1976).
144 Pendleton v. Rumsfeld, 628 F.2d 102, 108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
145 Id

146See, e.g., Bums v. Blackhawk Mgmt. Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 427, 433-36 (S.D.
Miss. 2007); Velez v. Janssen Ortho LLC, 389 F. Supp. 2d 253, 260-62 (D.P.R. 2005).
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benefits employers reap by having anti-discrimination policies and personnel
to implement them-benefits discussed in Part IV below. 147 The adoption of
anti-discrimination policies and the assignment of employees to administer
them may reflect an employer's strategic self-interest rather than a principled
commitment to workplace equality.
Rather than a proxy for causation-in-fact, the manager rule is better
understood as a curtailment of the employer's duty not to retaliate. The
manager rule functions like a no-duty rule in torts, cutting off the defendant's
liability notwithstanding the defendant's action causing injury. No-duty rules
have become a favored vehicle for grappling with the kinds of controversial
policy judgments that proximate cause is known for tackling. 148 Martha
Chamallas's study of third-party assault torts is instructive. 149 She traces the
shift from proximate cause to no-duty rules in third-party sexual assault cases
brought by victims against an institutional defendant that might have done
more to prevent attacks on its premises.1 50 Instead of adjudicating such
assaults to be not foreseeable, courts ruling against plaintiffs now more
typically limit the defendant's duty to protect against criminal sexual assaults
by a third party. While the determination of whether a tort defendant breached
a duty is usually made by the jury, the determination of whether the defendant
had a duty in the first place is a question of law determined by the court. 15 1
Similar to a no-duty rule, the manager rule requires courts to make
surreptitious policy judgments in order to decide, as a matter of law, the scope
of the employer's duty not to retaliate. By negating the element of protected
activity, the rule voids any duty on the part of the employer not to retaliate
against the plaintiff; in contrast, the question of whether the defendant acted
for a retaliatory reason is a question of fact.152 By keeping the case away from
the jury, both the manager rule and no-duty rules in tort protect defendants
from liability.
Like the reasonable belief doctrine, the manager rule might be
productively compared to more than one tort doctrine. It too bears a similarity
to proximate cause-a resemblance that is unsurprising given the porosity of
the line separating proximate cause from no-duty rules. Proximate cause
insists that it is not enough that the defendant's wrongful conduct caused harm
to someone; it must have been wrongful toward the plaintiff or the class of
persons to whom the plaintiff belongs.153 This principle is now submerged in
the Restatement (Third) of Torts' phrase, "scope of liability," which limits the
147

148

See infra Part IV.

Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1371-72. On the slipperiness of the categories of
proximate cause and no-duty rules, see DOBBS, supra note 102, at 584-85.
149
See Chamallas,supra note 101, at 1371-72.
150Id at 1374.
151Id. at 1380.
152

See B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 TUL. L. REv. 439, 458-59 (2008) (summarizing

how 153
the element of causation is established in retaliation cases).
See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1460.
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defendant's liability to those harms resulting from the same risks that made the
defendant's conduct tortious in the first place. 154
To return to Brush, the court in that case emphasized that the plaintiff
herself was not the victim of the alleged discrimination.155 In the terminology
of proximate cause, Brush was a bystander who was harmed by the employer's
hostility to the employee who made the rape accusation; that hostility landed
on Brush when she insisted on a stronger response to the accusation than the
employer was prepared to take. Using language with echoes of proximate
cause, the Brush court expressed skepticism about the "transitive property" of
Title VII claims in terms of providing any remedy to Brush, emphasizing that
she was not among those "directly impacted" by the underlying
discrimination. 156 By invoking the manager rule to block Title VII from
protecting persons not directly targeted by the discrimination, the court's
opinion carries the ring of proximate cause.
As scholars have long observed, proximate cause functions as a tool to cut
off liability in service of other policy objectives.1 57 In this respect, it is
functionally similar to no-duty rules.158
Whether compared to proximate cause or no-duty rules, the manager rule
bears considerable resemblance to tort principles. But like the reasonable
belief doctrine, there is both congruity and distortion in its tracking of tort
principles. The selective draw from torts has made Title VII's manager rule
more draconian than a carefully considered use of tort law for guidance would
support. A critical look at the particularities of this tort analogy would expose
the difficulties created by the manager rule and might prompt a rethinking of
its suitability for Title VII retaliation cases.
One way that the manager rule departs from tort law is in its use of agency
principles. Typically in tort law, scope of employment is used to impute an
employee's wrongful action to the employer for purposes of establishing
employer liability. 159 The manager rule, in contrast, uses scope of employment
principles to cut off the employer's duty not to retaliate when the plaintiff acts
within the scope of employment. Tort law uses scope of employment
principles to impute employer liability, while the manager rule uses it to cut
off employer liability. In torts, the focus is on the wrongdoer's scope of
15 4 See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 29 (20 10).

155 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App'x 781, 787 (11th Cir. 2012).
1561d.

157 See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1467; see also Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause,

supra note 47, at 1202-05.
158 Cf Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1374 (explaining that in third-party assault cases
courts have vacillated over time between no-duty rules and proximate cause as the vehicle
for cutting off the defendant's liability).
159
See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 VAL. U.
L. REv. 133, 136 (2013) (discussing scope of employment and vicarious liability rules in
tort law).
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employment in order to determine who acts on behalf of the defendant, while
the manager rule uses the plaintiffs scope of employment to block employer
liability. In this respect, the manager rule is more of a distortion than an
embrace of tort's scope of employment principles.
One possible parallel in tort law to the manager rule's use of scope of
employment is in the tort of wrongful discharge. However, this similarity may
be due as much to the circularity of Title VII's influence on tort law as to the
independent development of tort principles in this ill-defined tort. In the
wrongful discharge tort, too, an employee may end up outside the law's
protection if the employee acted within her job duties to oppose the
employer's misconduct. For example, in one case where the plaintiff was a
safety compliance officer in an industrial workplace, the plaintiff alleged that
he was fired for his efforts to correct the employer's environmental record and
for bringing compliance issues to the attention of a government enforcement
agency. 160 In a resulting claim for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy, the court ruled against the plaintiff on the ground that he
acted within the scope of his job responsibilities, which included oversight of
safety and compliance with environmental and safety regulations. This is a
case, however, in which Title VII doctrine appeared to shape the court's use of
tort principles. The court implicitly analogized the tort of wrongful discharge
to a Title VII claim for retaliation, citing Title VII cases applying the manager
rule to support the line it drew in the wrongful discharge action, and cutting
off liability based on the plaintiff s scope of employment.161
To the extent that Title VII's manager rule is taking its cue from tort law's
wrongful discharge case law on the plaintiffs scope of employment, it is a
very poor body of law from which to draw support for this doctrine. Despite
the occasional case tracking the manager rule, the wrongful discharge case law
contains more cases cutting in the opposite direction, denying recovery to
employees who act outside their job expertise to report or oppose employer
misconduct. Courts have denied recovery in wrongful discharge cases where
the employee protested illegality by the employer, but lacked the job expertise
to credibly evaluate the legality of the employer's actions. 162 It seems that
wrongful discharge plaintiffs can lose their cases whichever side of this line
160 Hill

v. Belk Store Sers., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-398, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79239, at

*1-3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2007).
161 Id. at *34 (citing Title VII precedents).
162 See, e.g., Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (3d Cir. 1990)
(denying wrongful discharge tort, and requiring the employee reporting employer

misconduct to have responsibility for the subject matter of the complaint); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. 427 A.2d 385, 388-89 (Conn. 1980) (permitting plaintiff to
bring a wrongful discharge claim, and emphasizing that he did have expertise and
responsibility for the subject matter of his complaints); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d
174, 178-79 (Pa. 1974) (denying wrongful discharge tort claim where plaintiff, a sales
representative, lacked the expertise and corporate responsibility to complain about
perceived safety problems).
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they straddle. Title VII retaliation law should not be replicating this
incoherence, although, as discussed above, that is precisely what is happening.
The Title VII case law simultaneously requires managerial employees to step
outside their roles in order to engage in protected activity, and yet punishes
them for doing so if they act insubordinately or disloyally. Rather than
squaring with generally applicable tort principles, the manager rule appears to
be tracking the incoherence and damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't
tension in the wrongful discharge tort.
The wrongful discharge tort shares other, equally ill-suited principles with
the Title VII case law applying the manager rule. The wrongful discharge tort
sets a notoriously high bar for the venality of employer misconduct that the
plaintiff opposed. It is a common refrain for courts in wrongful discharge
cases, in the course of ruling against the plaintiff, to point out that the
employer did not force the discharged employee to do anything that would
violate the criminal law.1 63 The court in Brush echoed this refrain, taking pains
to point out that the employer did not violate the criminal law in refusing to
report the rapes to the police, nor force the plaintiff to commit a crime when it
instructed her not to report the rapes. 164 While setting the threshold for
employer misconduct at the level of criminal law is draconian even for the
wrongful discharge claim, it is especially unsuitable for Title VII, which
protects the civil rights of employees to a non-discriminatory workplace.
Allowing the strict limits of the wrongful discharge claim into the retaliation
claim gives insufficient room for employees to act in the role Congress
envisioned as "private attorney general" to enforce Title VII.16 5
The tort of wrongful discharge is also a poor model for Title VII
retaliation claims in its distinction between public and private wrongdoing,
and its protection of employee actions opposing the former but not the latter.
To succeed in a wrongful discharge tort claim, courts insist that the employee
acted to vindicate a public interest and not merely a private interest.166 This is
a notoriously porous line.167 For example, courts have dismissed wrongful
163

See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 256 (Ariz. 1986) (distinguishing

employee actions to report employer wrongdoing from employee resistance to performing
a criminal act, and suggesting greater protection of the latter); Sheets, 427 A.2d at 388

(recognizing wrongful discharge tort claim, and noting that "[t]he plaintiffs position as
quality control director and operations manager might have exposed him to the possibility
of criminal prosecution under" federal law); City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209,
215-16 (Tex. 2000) (limiting wrongful discharge claims to cases where employer required
the employee to violate the criminal law); Fox v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 862
(Utah 1997) (denying recovery and emphasizing that the employer had not required the
plaintiff to commit a criminal act).
164 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App'x 781, 788 (11th Cir. 2012).
165 See
N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980).
166 Schwab, supra note 117, at 1944-45.
167

See id. at 1944 (describing this public-private distinction as "treacherous at best");

see also Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (stating that
"a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities
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discharge claims in which the plaintiff reported another employee's illegal
theft, explaining that the plaintiff did not exercise a legal right or interest of his
own, but intervened in a mere private matter between the employer and the coworker.168 Other cases classify an employee's whistleblowing to prevent the
employer from violating the law and incurring a penalty as involving only a
private matter, for the benefit of the employer. 169 These rulings purport to
distinguish workplace-related wrongdoing that affects the public interest from
that affecting only the private interest of the employer or employees.
As problematic as this distinction has proven to be in wrongful discharge
cases, it is all the more so in cases applying the manager rule. The manager
rule cases also deny protection to plaintiffs for addressing the rights of other
employees, instead of pressing their own complaints. In Brush, for example,
the court suggested the possibility of a different result if the plaintiff had acted
to protect her own rights to non-discrimination instead of those of a fellow
employee.1 70 Presumably, the court recognized that an employee who asserts
her own rights fulfills the private attorney general role of enforcing Title VII,
in service of the public interest. However, such a divide between the
employee's own rights and the rights of fellow workers is incoherent as
applied to Title VII retaliation claims. Protecting the Title VII rights of other
before the tort will be allowed," but acknowledging that "there is no precise line of
demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely
personal"). Not only is the public-private line porous, it invites the kind of public-private
dichotomy that feminist scholars have shown to marginalize those harms especially
affecting women. See, e.g., Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(refusing to recognize wrongful discharge claim for employer's firing of an employee who
was beaten and raped by her ex-husband, because employer's desire not to deal with this
situation did not implicate a sufficiently public interest); MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER
B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER AND TORT LAW 76-87 (2010).

168 See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 785-88 (Okla. 1995) (finding that
employee's reporting of criminal activity-embezzlement by a co-worker-did not
implicate a sufficiently "public" policy to give rise to a wrongful discharge tort claim);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (holding employee fired for
reporting that supervisor was under investigation for embezzlement did not have a
wrongful discharge tort claim because the employee's action served "only the private
interest of the employer").
169
See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987)
(finding that employee's reporting of employer's illegality did not sufficiently implicate
public policy so as to give rise to a wrongful discharge claim, and stating that wrongful
discharge claims should be limited to "situations involving the actual refusal to engage in
illegal activity, or the intention to fulfill a statutorily prescribed duty"); Foley, 765 P.2d at
380 (distinguishing protection of an employer's private interest in avoiding penalties from
the public interest).
170 Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp., 466 Fed. App'x 781, 783, 786 (11th Cir. 2012); cf
Hayes, 905 P.2d at 786-88 (emphasizing that employee who reported co-worker's
embezzlement was "not exercising any legal right or interest of his own," and
distinguishing cases where employees are fired for seeking to vindicate their own legal
rights).
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employees is just as much in the public interest as the promotion of one's own
Title VII rights. 17 1 Recognizing this, retaliation law generally protects persons
advocating for the non-discrimination rights of others.1 72 It also protects
persons targeted by the employer because of their relationship to the
complainant, at least if the relationship is a sufficiently close one. 173 There is
no principled reason why managers should have any less protection for
protecting the rights of other employees, even if such activity falls within their
job descriptions, than if they asserted their own rights. To the extent the
manager rule is replicating this dichotomy from the wrongful discharge tort,
the transplant is a gross mismatch.
The underlying policy served by both the manager rule and the tight limits
on the tort of wrongful discharge is essentially the same policy that underlies
tort law's no-duty rules and proximate cause: cutting off liability to protect the
defendant's freedom of action. In the employment setting, this preserves the
baseline of employment at will. The tort of wrongful discharge is an especially
effective vehicle for promoting this objective. The tort is known for its
stringency toward plaintiffs. 174 Expressing a widely shared sentiment, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut summed up a common judicial reaction to this
tort: "We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the
exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation." 75
Toward that end, the tort is ill-defined and difficult for plaintiffs to win. 176
This stringency reflects the tort's common law underpinnings as a narrow,
judicially-crafted intrusion into employment at will, triggering separation of
powers concerns that leave courts vulnerable to criticism for crafting judicial
remedies for violations of public policy that legislatures have not created.177
171 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At- Will World, 74

TEX. L. REv. 1655, 1665-66 (1996) (contending that retaliation protections for enforcing
statutory rights serve the public just as much as, and for the same reasons as, the
underlying substantive rights protected in the statute).
172
See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 273
(2009) (holding that Title VII opposition clause protects employee for testifying in support
of complainant in employer's internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint);
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (deciding that Title IX
protects a school basketball coach who opposed discrimination against student-athletes on
his team).
173
See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867, 870 (2011) (finding
that employer's retaliatory firing of the fianc6 of the complainant violates Title VII).
174
See Slater, supra note 43, at 98 ("Many of the states recognizing the public policy
exception [to at-will employment] have defined public policy very narrowly, such that only
a 'handful of employees' can use the tort of wrongful discharge."); see also Hayes, 905
P.2d at 785 (noting that the claim is "to be tightly circumscribed in light of the vague
meaning of the term public policy").
175 Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc. 427 A.2d 385, 387-88 (Conn. 1980).
176 See Estlund, supra note 171, at 1669-70.
177 See, e.g., Hill v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 3:06-cv-398, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79239 at *5 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 12, 2007) ("Courts in North Carolina are institutionally averse
to creating claims based on public policy."); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal.
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Focusing on the underlying objectives served by Title VII's analogy to
torts might help sort out which particular analogies to tort law are appropriate
for retaliation law and which are not. The wrongful discharge tort is an
exceptionally poor model for the Title VII retaliation claim. The statutory
claim does not raise the separation of powers ghost that haunts the tort of
wrongful discharge. As a statutory incursion into employment at will, Title VII
retaliation law should be guided foremost by the objectives of the statute.
Instead, the manager rule re-inscribes employer autonomy over the workplace
for a significant class of employees.
And yet, there is a degree of legitimacy in the policy concerns driving the
manager rule. Courts' embrace of the manager rule reflects a legitimate
concern that, without it, employers would lose the ability to supervise job
performance for some segment of the workforce. The fundamental problem
driving the manager rule is that, when part of the employee's job is to oversee
compliance with anti-discrimination law, the search for a retaliatory motive
cannot separate the illegitimate motive of retaliation from the legitimate
motive of job performance.1 78 For employees charged with enforcing antidiscrimination laws and policies in the workplace, punishing the employee for
how she performs this responsibility is both retaliatory and related to job
performance. Without the manager rule, when securing compliance with nondiscrimination laws and policies falls within employees' job duties, the
retaliation claim would deeply intrude into employer oversight of this group of
employees. On the other hand, the manager rule tilts the scales all the way in
the opposite direction, causing a complete withdrawal of retaliation protection
from the employees assigned such job responsibilities, effectively removing
them from Title VII's antiretaliation exception to employment at will. Instead
of a nuanced calibration of the conflicting employee and employer interests in
such conflicts, the manager rule selectively follows and distorts tort-like
principles to bolster the employment at will default regime.
Both the reasonable belief doctrine and the manager rule serve the same
core objective: reinvigorating the common law baseline of employment at will

1992) ("[C]ourts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to
the judgment of the legislative branch, lest they mistake their own predilections for public
policy which deserves recognition at law.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Murphy v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing to recognize tort for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, stating such rights "are best and more
appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government").
178 See, e.g., Correa v. Mana Prods., Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(explaining that, without such a rule, employees with EEO responsibilities would be
untouchable, a result that would intrude too deeply into the employer's ability to oversee
job performance); cf Whatley v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1326 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that Title VII does not prevent an employer from firing an employee
whose job it is to handle discrimination complaints when the employee does this contrary
to the employer's instructions).
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and limiting the extent of Title VII's statutory incursion into that baseline. 79
So far, tort's footprints in Title VII retaliation law have led in only one
direction, walking back the protection the law extends to employees. The next
section calls for greater attention to a side of tort law that has been missing so
far in tort's influence on Title VII retaliation law: the nature and degree of the
defendant's wrongfulness.

IV. TAKING TORTS SERIOUSLY
Despite the one-way influence of tort law to date in cutting back Title VII
liability for retaliation, there is room for making tort's role in this area more of
a two-way street. Rather than putting all efforts into resisting the intrusion of
torts into Title VII retaliation law-a losing proposition after Nassar-Title
VII scholars should undertake a reconstructive approach.
At a minimum, a forthright acknowledgement of tort law's impact on Title
VII retaliation doctrine should call attention to the ways Title VII case law has
selectively imported tort principles to curtail employer liability, distorting
those principles in the process. As discussed above, both the reasonable belief
doctrine and the manager rule, in tracking tort principles go farther in
protecting employer autonomy than tort principles dictate. The reasonable
belief doctrine stretches tort principles of plaintiff fault to reach a more
draconian result than analogous tort doctrines would require. The -manager rule
lines up with malleable tort rules (no-duty and proximate cause) that mask
judicial policy preferences; and to the extent it follows more particularized tort
doctrine, it aligns with an especially stingy tort-the wrongful discharge
claim-to a degree unsuitable for Title VII's statutory claim. Bringing tort
concepts out of the shadows and into the light should prompt a reconsideration
of the Title VII doctrines that have significantly narrowed the scope of
protected activity under the opposition clause. It also illuminates the extent to
which the Title VII retaliation case law has reinvigorated the employment at
will common law background rules, notwithstanding the purported statutory
incursion into that regime.
In addition to taking a more critical look at how courts have used tort-like
principles to limit Title VII liability, tort law might be mined for its potential
to place employer fault at the forefront of the analysis in a retaliation claim. In
Nassar, the Court repeatedly characterized the retaliation claim as a remedy
for "wrongful" action by the employer.180 The wrongfulness of the defendant's
conduct, as a matter of social policy, is at the foundation of tort law; it is what
fundamentally distinguishes torts from civil actions to enforce contract or
179

Cf Slater, supra note 43, at 97 (arguing that the common law baseline of
employment at will has encroached into its statutory exceptions, such as Title VII, because
courts have interpreted these statutory rights very narrowly).
180 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522, 2525 (2013). In the
first two paragraphs alone, the Court used the word "wrong," and words derived from it,
five times. Id. at 2522.
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property rights.18 Even the wrongful discharge claim, with its strict limits on
what is actionable, makes employer wrongfulness the focal point, as the very
name of the tort suggests. Courts describe the tort of wrongful discharge as
remedying an employer action that is "ex delicto"-from a wrong.182
So far, Title VII doctrine limiting the scope of protected activity has
invoked tort-inspired limits on plaintiff recovery without a corresponding
emphasis on employer fault. But tort law's fault-based focus could also
strengthen Title VII protection by more fully developing courts' understanding
of employer wrongfulness in the retaliation claim. Both the reasonable belief
doctrine and the manager rule, as applied by the lower courts, have let
employers reap the benefits of having anti-discrimination policies while
punishing the employees who use and administer them. Tort law might help
construct theories of.wrongfulness to address this unfairness and ameliorate
the harshness of these doctrines.
A starting point for probing employer wrongfulness is through the lens of
intentional torts. In a retaliation claim, the adverse action is no accident.1 83 if
the adverse action occurs because of a retaliatory intent, it is both wrongful
and intentional. Professor Sandra Sperino's argument that the closest tort
analogue to employment discrimination is intentional torts rather than
negligence applies equally to retaliation. 184
The analogy between retaliation and intentional torts is complex and more
nuanced, however.' 8 5 Intentional torts typically involve deliberate (that is, not
accidental) actions done with intent to harm or knowledge of a substantial
likelihood of causing harm.1 86 In an employment discrimination claim such as
retaliation, the adverse employment action-the firing for example-is
intentional, but its wrongfulness depends on the reason, or motive, for why it
181 See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 1 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:1, at 5-6

(2003).
182 See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980) (stating that "an
employee's action for wrongful discharge is ex delicto and subjects an employer to tort
liability").
183 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173-74 (2005)
("Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act."); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131
S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (analogizing the USERRA claim to an intentional tort, as opposed
to negligence, because it requires "that the actor intend the consequences of an act, not
simply the act itself") (internal quotation marks omitted).
184 Sperino, DiscriminationStatutes, supra note 47, at 37-38; see also Sullivan, supra

note 47, at 1459 ("[A] disparate-treatment Title VII violation is more akin to an intentional
tort.").
185
Perhaps it is the difficulty of settling on a tort analogy for retaliation that prompted

the Court to cite from a grab bag of tort principles, lumping in both negligence and
intentional torts. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2525 (citing Restatement provisions on negligence
and intentional torts).
186

See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L.

REv. 1061, 1063 (2006) (discussing the definition of intent in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts).
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was done. It is not the deliberate causing of harm that makes the adverse
employment action unlawful under Title VII. Even non-retaliatory firings
intentionally cause harm to the person fired. It is the intentionality of the
action combined with the wrongful reason for the action that makes it
unlawful.
This difference should not necessarily defeat the analogy to intentional
torts, however. With intentional torts, too, the reason for the intentional act
that causes harm may be relevant to the wrongfulness of the action, even if its
relevance is not always made explicit. For example, if the reason for hitting
someone is justified, such as intervening in an attack on a child, the
defendant's intent to throw a punch is not enough to make it actionable. 187 It is
the lack of justification for the punch, combined with the intent to harm, that
gives rise to the tort, as it is the retaliatory motive for the firing that makes the
retaliatory firing actionable. In retaliation claims and intentional torts, the
intentionality of the defendant's action, combined with the illegitimate motive
(or lack of justification), gives rise to the claim.
The analogy to intentional torts alone, however, will not fend off tortbased incursions into protected activity under Title VII. Grounding the
wrongfulness of the adverse action in the employer's retaliatory motive circles
right back to where the reasonable belief doctrine and the manager rule
entered, wrestling with the proper scope of protected activity. Whether the
employer acted with a retaliatory motive turns on the scope of protected
activity under the statute. Only if the employer acted with a motive to punish
employee conduct that qualifies as protected activity does the motive qualify
as retaliatory. A motive to punish an employee for complaining about
something that is not protected by the statute, for example, would not be
retaliatory under Title VII.
Where the analogy to intentional torts might help is in defining the proper
scope of protected activity. Courts should calibrate the boundary of protected
activity to fit the nature and degree of the employer's wrongfulness. For the
retaliation claim to fulfill its purpose-keeping open the channels for
enforcing statutory rights, including internal opposition to discrimination-the
category of protected activity must be expansive enough to capture the core
wrong of retaliation. In cases where the employee follows or administers an
employer's non-discrimination policy to report or address discrimination
covered by that policy, thereby triggering employer retaliation, there are two

187

See 8 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 181, § 26:10, at 289 (on the defense of others as a
defense to battery). Justification also matters in the tort of wrongful discharge. See Ellis v.

City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Wash. 2000) (listing among the elements of a claim
for wrongful discharge in violation against public policy that "[t]he defendant must not be

able to offer an overriding justification for the dismissal"); see also Simons, supra note
186, at 1084 & n.84 (discussing the "prima facie" tort of intentionally causing harm, and
quoting the Restatement (Second) definition that the conduct "is generally culpable and not
justifiable under the circumstances").
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dimensions of employer wrongfulness that the definition of protected activity
should take into account.
First, there is the wrongfulness toward the individual employee who is
encouraged to use or administer the employer's policy on non-discrimination
and then punished for doing so. When the retaliation claim is brought under
the opposition clause and the opposition is expressed through the employer's
internal complaint procedures, there is a distinct dimension of wrongfulness to
the employer's retaliation. Not only does the retaliation interfere with the work
lives of individual employees and the enforcement of statutory rights, it
enables the employer to have its cake and eat it too: the employer benefits
from having an anti-discrimination policy-benefits discussed in greater detail
below 188-- even though the policy is effectively nullified by the retaliation. It
is tantamount to fraudulent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment (a
principle rooted in corrective justice) for the employer to benefit from having
anti-discrimination policies, while retaliating against the employees who use
and administer them. 189 In this respect, the retaliation claim under the
opposition clause has an additional dimension of wrongfulness compared to a
Title VII participation clause claim, where the employee is punished for using
the statute's official enforcement mechanisms. When the employer's policy
encouraged the employee's opposition, the wrongfulness of the retaliation is
heightened by the employer's self-serving decision to capture the benefits of
having anti-discrimination policies while punishing their use. The focus of
intentional torts on defendant wrongfulness might productively call attention
to this dimension of employer wrongfulness, which the case law on protected
activity so far has failed to consider.
A second type of wrong addressed by the retaliation claim is the public
harm to law enforcement stemming from the employer's interference with the
enforcement of statutory rights. The scope of protected activity should be
broad enough to reflect the role played by internal anti-discrimination policies
in the enforcement of statutory rights. By now, employer anti-discrimination
policies have been so thoroughly integrated into Title VII's statutory
framework-a point discussed in more depth belowl 90-that sabotaging their
use thwarts statutory rights just as much as an employer's interference with
external enforcement channels.

188 See infra pp. 1407-11.
189
See DOBBS, supra note 102, §§ 469-470, at 1343-46 (discussing fraudulent
misrepresentation). Although unjust enrichment defies easy categorization in the traditional
common law categories of tort, property and contracts, it shares an animating theory of
corrective justice with tort law. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law:

Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1801, 1802-11 (1997)

(discussing the corrective justice underpinnings of tort law); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The
Heart of Corrective Justice, 79 TEX. L. REv. 2115, 2115 (2001) (arguing that unjust
enrichment is based on a theory of corrective justice);.
190 See infra pp. 1420-21.
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The analogy to intentional torts might also be marshaled to resist the
particular ways lower courts have used the reasonable belief doctrine and
manager rule to circumscribe protected activity under Title VII. If retaliation is
an intentional tort, proximate cause-type limits on protected activity are out of
place. Proximate cause does not play the same role in intentional torts as in
negligence-based wrongs. 191 In an intentional tort, the defendant is more likely
to be liable for the full extent of the harm, without regard to foreseeability.1 92
The defendant's culpability-the seriousness of the harm and the degree of the
deviation from "appropriate care"--can reduce the role proximate cause plays
in limiting liability.193 To the extent that both the reasonable belief doctrine
and the manager rule are tracking proximate cause-inspired limits on liability,
aligning retaliation with intentional torts might help check these doctrines.
The analogy to intentional torts could also be used to question overly
stringent applications of plaintiff fault as a limit on protected activity. As
discussed above, the reasonable belief doctrine mimics tort-inspired limits on
plaintiff fault, akin to a de facto contributory negligence rule. However,
contributory negligence does not negate liability for an intentional tort. A
defendant's wrongfulness in intentionally causing harm is not ameliorated by
the injured person's failure to take reasonable care to avoid the harm. 194
Analogizing retaliation to an intentional tort might help rein in the reasonable
belief rule, at least insofar as the employee's belief about discrimination
conforms to the employer's anti-discrimination policy.
Even if the analogy to intentional torts falters and negligence emerges as
the guiding tort framework for the Title VII retaliation claim, fault-based
concepts should be developed to resist the tort-inspired limits on protected
activity that have taken hold in the case law. Under a negligence framework,
both the duty not to retaliate (in relation to managerial employees) and the role
of contributory negligence (in the form of the reasonable belief doctrine)
should be calibrated to take into account the full scope of the employer's
wrongfulness. 195 In retaliation claims brought under the opposition clause, the
wrongfulness of the adverse action is heightened by the employer's decision to

191 See Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, supra note 47, at 10; Sperino, Statutory

Proximate Cause,supra note 47, at 1206-07; Sullivan, supra note 47, at 1459.
192 Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, supra note 47, at 1206.

193 Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL &

EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (2010)).
194
See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 200, at 498; Chamallas, supra note 101, at 1381; see

also DOBBS, supra note 102, § 206, at 517-21 (discussing the modern, more nuanced
approach to comparative negligence in intentional torts).
195 DOBBS, supra note 102, § 229, at 582-83 (discussing the factors taken into account
in determining the defendant's duty); id. § 202, at 506-07 (discussing comparative fault);
see also 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 181, § 1:4, at 14-16 (discussing fault in tort law as
responsive to changes in social conditions); Schwartz, supra note 189, at 1815-19 (1997)
(arguing that corrective justice-with its focus on relational fairness and not just economicbased deterrence rationales-underlies negligence-based torts).
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benefit from the adoption of internal anti-discrimination policies and the
assignment of responsibility to employees for implementing them.
Taking this one step further, the employer's adoption of an antidiscrimination policy should be viewed as an affirmative undertaking by the
defendant, with reliance by the plaintiff, giving rise to a duty on the defendant
to take reasonable care. 19 6 Tort law places a duty of reasonable care on a
person who need not, in the first instance, take measures to avoid harm, but
voluntarily assumes a duty to do so. 197 Likewise, while an employer need not
promise anti-discrimination protection beyond what is required by Title VII,
having done so, it should have a duty of care not to punish persons who use
the employer's policies to report discrimination. Similarly, having created
anti-discrimination policies and charged certain employees to oversee and
administer them, the employer should be viewed as assuming a duty not to
retaliate against them for doing so. The employer's punishment of employees
for following or administering internal anti-discrimination policies that the
employer affirmatively adopted should be viewed as a breach of that duty.
The above arguments for using intentional tort and negligence concepts to
direct attention to employer fault and strengthen retaliation protections rest on
the assertion that employers benefit from having anti-discrimination policies
and procedures in place. The following section briefly sketches those benefits
and considers their implications for Title VII retaliation law more broadly.
IV. THE INTEGRATION OF EMPLOYER NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
INTO TITLE VII's LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A
FAULT-BASED APPROACH TO RETALIATION
Whether intentional torts or negligence ultimately sticks as the guiding
analogy for the retaliation claim, the wrongfulness of retaliating against an
employee for using internal complaint channels cannot be fully appreciated
without understanding the outsized role these policies play in Title VII law and
the benefits employers gain from adopting them. Over the past two decades,
employment discrimination law has increasingly incentivized-both formally
and informally-the adoption of internal anti-discrimination policies and
complaint procedures. The most well known of these stem from the employer
liability rules for supervisor sexual harassment, which the Supreme Court
announced in a pair of cases decided in 1998.198 That framework imposes
vicarious liability on employers for sexual harassment by a supervisor, subject
to an affirmative defense. The affirmative defense makes the existence of
internal policies and procedures for addressing sexual harassment a virtual
196

See DOBBS, supra note 102, § 319, at 860-64.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.

FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 42 (2010).
19 8 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
197
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necessity in order to avoid liability in such cases. 199 This same liability
framework, and resulting incentives for adopting internal policies, applies to
other forms of unlawful harassment too, including harassment based on race,
religion, or national origin. Employer liability rules for harassment by nonsupervisors (co-workers or customers), while not governed by the affirmative
defense per se, also incentivize internal policies and grievance procedures. The
fault-based "knew or should have known" standard courts apply to nonsupervisory workplace harassment is more easily established if the employer
lacked a viable policy for reporting harassment. 200
The employer liability rules for harassment are only the beginning of the
legal incentives for employers to adopt internal policies and procedures
addressing discrimination. In all discrimination cases, employers benefit from
having anti-discrimination policies. Even if the plaintiff proves discrimination
in court, having such a policy can inoculate the employer against a punitive
damages award. 20 1 Apart from damages, socio-legal scholars have found that
anti-discrimination policies significantly influence whether legal actors view
employers as compliant with the law. In practice, the EEOC is less likely to
find "cause" to believe that discrimination occurred if the employer had an
anti-discrimination policy. 202 Such policies convey the impression of a wellmeaning employer, one with a visible commitment to non-discrimination
rather than one that acts with a discriminatory intent. 203 Judges, too, look more
favorably on employers with anti-discrimination policies and tend to equate
having such policies with legal compliance. 204
If the Court's musings in Staub are any indication, the value of antidiscrimination policies to employers may further appreciate. In discussing the
role of proximate cause in a cat's paw scenario, the Court left open the
possibility that a truly independent internal investigation might exonerate the
defendant from liability for a subordinate's discriminatory action. The Court
suggested that it might break the chain of proximate cause if the plaintiff failed
to use an available internal channel to complain about the allegedly
199
See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 25, at 391 (summarizing case law and stating,
"[a]lthough the Supreme Court has stated that an employer need not necessarily have
promulgated an antiharassment policy to satisfy its duty of reasonable care, it is unusual for
an employer to prevail absent such a policy").
2 00
See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2463-64 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 2453 (majority opinion) ("Assuming that a harasser is not a
supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her employer was negligent
in failing to prevent harassment from taking place.").
201 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544-46 (1999).
202
C. Elizabeth Hirsh & Sabino Kornrich, The Context of Discrimination: Workplace

Conditions, Institutional Environments, and Sex and Race DiscriminationCharges, 113

AM. J. Soc. 1394, 1424-25 (2008).
203 See C. Elizabeth Hirsh, Settling for Less? Organizational Determinants
of

Discrimination-ChargeOutcomes, 42 L. & Soc'Y REV. 239, 250-51 (2008).

204 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to

InstitutionalizedEmployment Structures, 117 Am. J. Soc. 888, 906, 929-30 (2011).
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discriminatory action. 205 If this dictum comes to fruition, internal antidiscrimination policies will have the added benefit of limiting employer
liability for adverse actions induced by a subordinate employee acting upon a
discriminatory motivation.
Given the role internal anti-discrimination policies play in Title VII's legal
landscape, the bifurcation of internal and external complaint channels-with
their different levels of protection-should be revisited. 206 Short of such a
stark change in retaliation doctrine, however, the determination of protected
activity under the opposition clause should at least take into account the
employer's role in enticing and even requiring employees to use employer
channels for addressing discrimination.
The wrongfulness of an employer profiting from the adoption of an antidiscrimination policy and complaint procedure, and then turning around and
retaliating against employees for participating in them, was not lost on the
Supreme Court when it addressed a distinct issue of retaliation law in
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County.2 07 In
that case, the employer allegedly retaliated against an employee for
participating as a corroborating witness in an internal investigation of a sexual
harassment complaint brought by a co-worker. 208 The lower court had ruled
that the plaintiffs participation as a witness in an internal investigation
pursuant to the employer's anti-harassment policy did not qualify as
opposition to discrimination, and therefore was not protected activity under
Title VII. 20 9 The Supreme Court reversed and emphatically rejected the
employer's argument that permitting retaliation claims by witnesses in internal
investigations would deter employers from undertaking such voluntary
compliance efforts. 2 10 The Court's rejoinder emphasized how deeply Title VII
liability rules have incentivized internal anti-discrimination policies and
grievance procedures, and how commonplace such policies are in the
workplace. 2 11 Calling the rule proposed by the employer "freakish," the Court
20 5

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 n.4 (2011) ("We also observe that
Staub took advantage of Proctor's grievance process, and we express no view as to whether
Proctor would have an affirmative defense if he did not."); see also Sullivan, supra note
47, at 1434 & n.9 (suggesting that Staub will likely increase the role of employers' antidiscrimination policies and complaint procedures).
20 6
Orly Lobel, Remarks in New Ways of Governing the Workplace: Proceedings of
the 2007 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations
and Employment Law (transcript in 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 11l, 113-19) (arguing
against the current default in workplace law of providing greater protection for employee
exercises of external voice than internal voice).
20 7
Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 279
(2009).
20 8
1d. at 273-74.
209 Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 211 Fed. App'x 373,
376-77 (6th Cir. 2006).
210 Crawford, 555 U.S. at 278.
.2 11 Id. at 278-79.
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exhibited sensitivity to the unfairness of a legal framework that would reward
employers for adopting anti-discrimination policies but allow them to retaliate
against the employees who participate in them. 2 12 While the Court's holding in
Crawford is a narrow one, ruling that witness participation in internal
grievance procedures may qualify as protected "opposition" to discrimination,
the Court's opinion lays the building blocks for a broader view of employer
wrongfulness in the retaliation claim. The tension the Court noted in Crawford
is palpable in the case law discussed above, in which lower courts have
enabled employers to punish employees for following internal antidiscrimination policies to report discrimination, and for administering these
policies and complaint procedures, by crafting tort-inspired limits on what
counts as protected activity.
Another recent Supreme Court retaliation case offers further hope for
developing conceptions of employer wrongfulness broad enough to resist the
tort-inspired limits on Title VII retaliation claims discussed above, particularly
the manager rule. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,213 the Court
construed the class of persons to whom the employer owes a duty not to
retaliate to include persons other than the complainant. 214 In that case the
Court ruled that retaliating against the complainant's fianc6 was actionable
under Title VII, and that the fianc6 himself, as a "person aggrieved," could sue
for the retaliation. 2 15 The Court was not tempted to construct a proximate
cause-type roadblock limiting the employer's liability to only those retaliatory
actions taken against a complainant. 2 16 The wrongfulness of the employer's
conduct supported the Court's broad, purpose-driven approach to statutory
interpretation in that case. The Thompson holding does not sweep so far as to
call into question the manager rule cases; the Court limited its reasoning to
persons in a "close relationship" with the complainant. 2 17 However, to the
extent the wrongfulness of the employer's actions drove the Court's result, the
reasoning suggests that the Court may be receptive to arguments about
employer wrongfulness in targeting EEO personnel, who are not themselves
complainants, but who are subjected to discrimination for investigating and
addressing other employees' discrimination complaints pursuant to employer
policies.
Both Crawford and Thompson show the Supreme Court to be alert to the
potential for employer wrongdoing and on guard against interpretations of
Title VII that would invite it. In addition, Nassar forthrightly invokes an
analogy to torts as a fitting lens for construing the retaliation claim, repeatedly
describing the claim as one for remedying employer wrongdoing. Together,
these cases open the door to the potential for using tort principles as an
212I. at 278.

213 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
214Id at 867-68.
2 15
Id at 870.
216Id at 868-69.
217 d.
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interpretive guide to nudge Title VII closer to capturing wrongful retaliation.
Title VII's wholesale embrace of employer non-discrimination policies is a big
part of what makes employer retaliation so wrongful under the opposition
clause. Shifting the tort lens to hone in on employer fault is a productive way
to push back against the one-way use of tort principles that has so far taken
hold in the lower courts to limit employer liability.
V. CONCLUSION
After the Court's packaging of retaliation as a tort in Nassar, any agenda
to keep tort law out of Title VII retaliation law has already been lost. Even if
the explicit importation of tort principles in this area could be halted, it would
not prevent the surreptitious influence of tort-inspired limits on retaliation
claims. Without naming tort law as the foundation for the reasonable belief
doctrine and the manager rule, lower court decisions applying these doctrines
bear the footprints of torts.2 18 In these cases, the pull of at-will employment
and the presumption-reflected in Nassar-that employers generally act for
legitimate reasons has been driving courts' turn to torts. 2 19 Tort law may be
here to stay, but there is room to resist its selective and one-way use to cut
short employer liability. A more faithful use of tort principles would
reinvigorate the concept of employer wrongfulness as the touchstone for the
retaliation claim-a focus that has been lost in the lower court's piecemeal
approach to tort-inspired principles.
This Article has argued that a big part of what makes the employer's
conduct wrongful in retaliation cases bought under the opposition clause is
that employers are benefitting from having anti-discrimination policies while
punishing employees for using and implementing them. Like a tort, this
wrongfulness exists apart from any contractual obligation not to retaliate for
the use or implementation of these processes. Indeed, well-crafted antidiscrimination policies avoid creating such contractual rights for employees
2 18

Cf William R. Corbett, Unmasking a Pretextfor Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Proposalto

Let Employment DiscriminationSpeak for Itself 62 AM. U. L. REv. 447, 454-56 (2013)

(arguing that, although courts have not explicitly invoked the tort doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in Title VII cases, that is effectively what they have done in adopting the pretext
proof method).
219

See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2531-32 (2013). The

Court's concern, that a more lenient standard for proving causation-in-fact would result in
excessive liability and invite frivolous claims, might have been exacerbated by retaliation
law's allowance of proximity in time to infer proof of causation. To borrow an analogy
from Bill Corbett, proximity is the res ipsa loquitur of retaliation: the closeness in time
between the protected activity and the adverse actions speaks for itself, creating an
inference of retaliatory intent. Corbett, supra note 218, at 486-91 (arguing that the
McDonnell Douglas proof structure is a de facto res ipsa loquitur rule). Judicial anxiety
about inferring causation from proximity may be driving courts to set limits on protected
activity in order to keep the retaliation claim in check.
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that would give rise to a breach of contract action. 220 Whether or not the
employer made a legally binding promise not to retaliate, the core wrong
stems from the violation of the social policy codified in Title VII. In addition
to impeding the enforcement of statutory rights, there is the added wrong of
employers inducing employees to address discrimination internally, within a
legal framework that rewards employers for having anti-discrimination
policies, while punishing employees for following or executing those very
policies. Tort principles should be redirected to capture this core of
wrongfulness at the heart of the retaliation claim.

220

See Slater, supra note 43, at 98 (noting that the creation of contract rights by such
policies can be avoided by the inclusion of appropriate disclaimers).
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